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Financial frictions can amplify the impact of changes in interest rates on economic activity. Accordingly, understanding the way in which …nancial conditions a¤ect …rms' demand of productive factors becomes relevant for an optimal design of monetary policy. In addition, in the context of the euro area, the knowledge of potential di¤erences in the investment rate sensitivity to changes in …rms' …nancial position across countries or across di¤erent types of …rms is crucial for a better understanding of the impact of a single monetary policy.
This paper investigates the sensitivity of investment rates to changes in …rms'…nancial position, using a large sample of non-…nancial corporations in six major euro area countries (Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain). We proxy …nancial pressure using three …nancial ratios: pro…tability, net indebtedness and the interest rate burden. The expected relationship between the …rst …nancial ratio and investment activity is positive: …nanc-ing constraints resulting from asymmetric information problems imply that …rms tend to invest more when they have more internal resources available. As for the indebtedness ratio, although debt may have some desirable properties (it allows …nancing projects in the absence of internal resources), the commitment to repay the debt may have a negative in ‡uence on …rms'spending decisions (it might make it more di¢ cult for …rms to access additional credit to …nance new investment projects). The third ratio measures …rms'capacity to meet interest payments with their earnings, and is also expected to present a negative relationship with investment rates.
The results show that …rms'…nancial position is important to explain their capital expenditures since the three …nancial ratios considered are found to be signi…cant when included in an investment equation: indebtedness and debt burden are found to exert a negative impact on investment, while cash ‡ow is positively linked to it. We …nd a certain degree of heterogeneity across countries in the magnitude of this impact: …rms in the Netherlands and Italy are found to be the ones with the highest marginal impact of …nancial pressure on investment rates, while the lowest has been found for German …rms.
In the paper we also give an insight on how, by altering the …nancial pressure experienced by …rms in servicing their debt, monetary policy may operate through the corporate sector. A simple exercise quanti…es how much investment rates change across countries, ceteris paribus, due to an increase in the cost of debt …nancing. Overall, taking into consideration our estimates on the sensitivity of investment to changes in the debt burden and the levels of this ratio in each country, the results show that Italian …rms would be the most a¤ected.
Introduction
The analysis of the …nancial position of non-…nancial corporations and their responses to …nan-cial pressure are important elements in any assessment of the macroeconomic outlook, as …rms' …nancial situation can condition …rms'real decisions. For example, excessive indebtedness or a high debt-service burden can have an adverse e¤ect on investment spending, thereby contributing to deepen recessions or to delay or dampen upturns. Accordingly, understanding the way in which …nancial conditions a¤ect …rms' demand of productive factors -and more speci…cally investment, which represents 20% of euro area GDP-becomes relevant for an optimal design of monetary policy. In addition, in the context of the euro area, the knowledge of potential di¤er-ences in the investment rate sensitivity to changes in …rms' …nancial position across countries or across di¤erent types of …rms is crucial for a better understanding of the impact of a single monetary policy.
As has been widely emphasized in the literature, credit market imperfections such as asymmetric information problems result in a wedge between the cost of funds raised externally (by issuing equity or debt) and funds generated internally (retained earnings). This wedge (the external …nance premium) will depend on the borrower …nancial position (for example, it can depend on the level of net wealth that can be provided as collateral), resulting in …rm …nancial situation being relevant in determining its investment decisions. As the balance sheet channel literature emphasizes, the existence of this external …nance premium implies that monetary policy will be transmitted to …rms not only through the traditional interest rate channel, but also through the impact it has on this premium: higher interest rates increase debt servicing payments, erode cash ‡ow and reduce collateral values, something that increases the external …nance premium and squeezes …rm demand for loans (the …nancial accelerator mechanism).
From the seminal paper by Fazzari et al. (1988) , most of the discussion on the impact of credit market imperfections on corporate investment has relied on the analysis of the response of capital expenditures to cash ‡ow. The basic working hypothesis behind this strand of the …nancing constraints literature is that this response should be higher …rms that face a larger wedge between the cost of internal and external funds. However, much less work has been done on the analysis that variables such as indebtedness or debt burden have on …rms' spending decisions.
This paper analyses how …rms' …nancial position a¤ects their investment decisions. It makes two contributions to the existing literature on this area. First, di¤erently from most previous papers analysing the impact of …nancial constraints on investment, we do not just
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September 2008 focus on investment sensitivity to cash ‡ow ratios but also on the impact of changes in debt burden and indebtedness on capital expenditures. Second, our analysis is based on a large panel dataset with a high percentage of small and medium sized …rms (over 85% in four out of the six countries considered -Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, which broadly represent 90% of euro area GDP-), which are in fact those thought to be more a¤ected by asymmetric information problems and hence are likely to face a higher external …nance premium. In contrast, much of the existing empirical work has been based on datasets with a high proportion of large …rms, which are likely to su¤er less from informational asymmetries and have a better access to capital markets.
Looking at the results, we conclude that …rms'…nancial position is important to explain their capital expenditures: indebtedness and debt burden are found to exert a negative impact on investment, while cash ‡ow is positively linked to it. We …nd a certain degree of heterogeneity across countries in the magnitude of this impact: …rms in the Netherlands and Italy are found to be the ones with the highest marginal impact of …nancial pressure on investment rates, while the lowest has been found for German …rms.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on the link between …rms'investment decisions and …nancial factors. Section 3 describes the data used. Section 4 provides a descriptive analysis on the relationship between investment rates and …rms' …nancial position. Section 5 presents the model and the estimation method, and the results are shown in Section 6. The potential reasons behind the di¤erences in the results across countries are presented in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 summarises the main results and concludes.
Review of the literature
In the past years, a large body of the literature has provided robust empirical evidence that …nancial factors have a signi…cant impact on …rms' investment decisions. While traditional research on investment was based on the neoclassical theory of optimal capital accumulation (where, under the assumption of perfect capital markets, the cost of …nancing does not depend on the …rm' …nancial position), more recent literature has increasingly incorporated frictions such as asymmetric information and agency problems as a source behind the relevance of the degree of …nancial pressure faced by the …rm in determining the availability and the costs of external …nancing . In this sense, the extent to which these frictions a¤ect capital expenditures
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depends on the …rm'balance sheet structure, which will determine its creditworthiness; higher debt servicing payments, higher leverage or lower cash ‡ow will have a negative impact on the …rm'creditworthiness and hence, all else being equal, will increase the external …nance premium and reduce the demand for external …nancing.
Starting with the seminal work by Fazzari et al. (1988) , many empirical studies tested the hypothesis that if external …nancing is available without frictions, a …rm's investment should be determined by its investment opportunities, usually proxied by Tobin's Q, and not by its internal resources, captured by a …rm's cash ‡ow. The higher sensitivity of investment or …rms'growth to internal sources was taken as evidence for the presence of …nancing constraints (see also Fazzari et al., 2000, and Carpenter and Petersen, 2002) . However, after the results presented by Zingales (1997 and , several studies have criticised the empirical test based on the cash ‡ow sensitivity as a meaningful evidence in favour of the existence of …nancing constraints. The signi…cance of the cash ‡ow sensitivity of investment, it was argued, may then be the consequence of measurement errors in the usual proxy for investment opportunities, Tobin's Q, and may provide additional information on expected pro…tability rather than being a signal of …nancing constraints. For example, Gomes (2001) shows that the existence of …nancing constraints is not su¢ cient to establish cash ‡ow as a signi…cant regressor in a standard investment equation, while Ericson and Whited (2000) demonstrate that the investment sensitivity to cash ‡ow in regressions including Tobin's Q is to a large extent due to a measurement error in Q. Likewise, Alti (2003) shows that investment can be sensitive to changes in cash ‡ow in the benchmark case where …nancing is frictionless. In this respect, Bond et al. (2003) indicate that if the role of cash ‡ow as proxy of future pro…tability is similar across countries, interpreting higher cash ‡ow sensitivities in a country as an e¤ect of …nancing constraints is less ambiguous and di¤erences in the estimated coe¢ cients of the cash ‡ow variable across countries are more likely to re ‡ect di¤erences in …nancing constraints.
In this article, we will focus not only on the link between investment and cash ‡ow but also on other balance sheet indicators, namely the leverage level and the debt-servicing payments, to analyze the impact of …nancial factors on …rms' investment decisions of …rms.
In this respect, in the seminal paper, Meyers (1977) analyses possible externalities generated by debt on shareholders' and management optimal investment strategy. More generally, debt overhang models explain two distinct sorts of implications: ex post (once the debt burden is in place), they suggest that highly leveraged …rms will be particularly discouraged to invest further, especially if new investment is …nanced by issuing claims that are junior to the existing debt. Ex ante, they explain why even low-leveraged …rms may be reluctant to raise much debt,
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The empirical evidence on the impact of leverage on investment is less extensive than that focusing on the sensitivity of investment to cash ‡ow variations. In Bond and Meghir (1994) the external …nancing cost is shown to be dependent on the level of indebtedness by capital unit.
In the same line, Estrada and Vallés (1998) test, for a sample of Spanish companies, a model that considers the level of net indebtedness as a determinant of the external …nancing cost. Lang et al. (1996) and Aivazian et al. (2005) , using US and Canadian data respectively, show that leverage is negatively related to investment and that this negative e¤ect is signi…cantly stronger for …rms with low growth opportunities than those with high growth opportunities. Likewise, Whited (1992) …nds that …rms with higher leverage and higher ratio of interest expenses to cash ‡ow (that should therefore be more …nancially constrained than the others) have a higher investmentcash ‡ow sensitivity. In the same line, results in Benito and Hernando (2007) and indicate that the impact of indebtedness -and debt burden-on investment is non-linear and becomes relatively more intense when …nancial pressure exceeds a certain threshold. For the UK, Marchica and Mura (2007) investigate explicitly the impact of a distinct leverage policy on the investment ability of …rms and …nd that the way the level of external debt in ‡uences a company's ability to invest may di¤er depending on whether the company is below or above its target leverage.
Our paper is closely related to the work of Benito and Hernando (2007) and , which analyse the impact of alternative measures of …nancial pressure on the investment and employment decisions of Spanish …rms We follow their choice of …nancial indicators to proxy …rms'…nancial pressure and analyse their impact on investment decisions for a set of …rms operating in six euro area countries, as it will be explained the following section.
3 Data and sample overview The upper panel of Table 1 reports the mean and median values of the variables used in the econometric analysis (see Data Appendix detail on the de…nition of the variables used). As can be seen, the investment rate, the pro…tability ratio and, more signi…cantly, the debt burden show a positively skewed distribution. The investment rate presents a median value around 11%-13% over the sample period except for Germany, where it is somewhat lower (9% while the typical Italian …rm shows the highest one, in line with the higher indebtedness and lower pro…tability ratios observed in this country. Di¤erences in the debt structure of …rms are also playing a role in explaining debt burden dispersion across countries. For example, Italian …rms have traditionally relied on expensive short-term debt …nancing, something that probably contributes to their higher debt burden ratios (although this has changed in the recent years, when they have importantly reduced the weight of short-term debt on their liabilities). Likewise, the comparatively high reliance on inter-company loans in Belgium -a source of funds cheaper than bank loans-probably contributes to explain the relatively low debt burden observed in this country. Non-…nancial corporations in Germany are those more dependent on bank loans, while
French companies are those that rely comparatively more on securities other than shares as a source of external …nancing 2 .
To sum up, Italy is the country in which the position of the median …rm seems comparatively weaker while the strongest position is observed for French …rms, which are characterised by the lowest levels of indebtedness and interest burden and by relatively high growth rates of sales and high pro…tability and investment ratios.
The impact of …nancial variables on …rms' investment decisions: descriptive evidence
The descriptive analysis of the previous section has shown that there exists a noticeable heterogeneity in the …nancial variables under consideration across countries not only in their development over time but also in their levels. A key question to analyse is whether these di¤erences in …nancial position are going to have an impact on …rms'spending decisions and, more speci…cally, on …rms'investment rates.
A simple way to obtain some preliminary evidence about how …nancial pressure a¤ects …rms'investment is to plot how the investment rate varies in each country across …rms facing di¤erent degree of …nancial pressure. For this purpose, Charts 6, 7 and 8 compare the median level of the investment rate in each country for three di¤erent corporate groupings, which are de…ned on the basis of their …nancial position. The latter is proxied by cash ‡ow (Chart 6), indebtedness (Chart 7) and debt burden (Chart 8).
In particular, the di¤erent panels in Chart 6 present the median investment rate in each 
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September 2008 country for …rms with high cash ‡ow -over assets-(above the 90th percentile), medium cash ‡ow (…rms for which this ratio stands between the 45th and the 55th percentile) and low cash ‡ow (lower decile). As can be seen, there is a clear relationship between pro…ts generated and …rms' capital demand, as …rms with higher level of cash ‡ow over their assets show higher investment rates.
Chart 7 depicts the median investment rates for …rms facing di¤erent degrees of …nancial pressure when it is measured by the indebtedness level 3 . Although debt may have some desirable properties (it allows …nancing projects in the absence of internal resources), the commitment to repay the debt may have a negative in ‡uence on …rms'spending decisions. The descriptive evidence shown in the chart points in this direction for Belgium, Germany and France, since investment rates present a negative relationship with indebtedness. In the two …rst of these countries, a non-linear relationship seems to exist between indebtedness and investment rates, since there are not marked di¤erences in investment rates for …rms with a moderate and low level of indebtedness while for highly indebted …rms their demand for capital is substantially lower. In Italy, the Netherlands and Spain the relationship derived from this descriptive analysis seems to be less clear-cut.
Chart 8 compares the investment rates using the relative burden of debt as a proxy for …nancial pressure. Firms with a higher debt burden in relation to their capacity to generate funds have substantially lower investment rates in all countries. This simple descriptive analysis also indicates that in some countries (especially Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain, and somewhat less clearly, Italy) the relationship between …nancial pressure and investment might be non-linear, as no marked di¤erences in investment rates are observed between those …rms with the lowest …nancial pressure and those with average …nancial pressure, while …rms facing a high degree of …nancial pressure show substantially lower investment rates. This hypothesis has already been tested in Hernando and Martinez-Carrascal (2008) indebtedness and investment rates is analysed. The absence of a clear link in this case might be the result of two opposite e¤ects: on the one hand, highly indebted …rms may experience problems in gaining access to additional external funds to …nance their projects; on the other hand, companies with higher investment levels might be those that have been more successful in attracting external funds to …nance their growth opportunities.
Model speci…cation and estimation method
The estimation analysis in this section consists in examining the responsiveness of …xed investment to changes in the …nancial position faced by a company, which is proxied by means of the three …nancial variables presented in the previous section: pro…tability, indebtedness and debt burden. The model estimated is an error-correction model which speci…es a target level of the capital stock and allows for a ‡exible speci…cation of the short-run investment dynamics, in which we add di¤erent …nancial indicators as potential explanatory variables. The depreciation rate is subsumed into the unobserved …rm-speci…c e¤ects and it is assumed that variation in the user cost of capital can be controlled for by including time-speci…c, sectoral-speci…c and …rm-speci…c e¤ects 4 . The equation to be estimated is:
where i indexes companies i=1,2..N and t indexes year t=1,2...T . denotes a …rst di¤erence, I/K is the investment rate, y is the log of real sales, k is the log of real …xed capital stock, and X it represents a vector of …nancial variables (pro…tability, indebtedness and debt burden) already described in the previous section These …nancial ratios are lagged one period to reduce possible endogeneity. i are company-speci…c …xed e¤ects, t are time e¤ects that control
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September 2008 for macroeconomic in ‡uences on …xed investment common across companies and S i control for sectoral e¤ects constant over time. " it is a serially-uncorrelated, but possibly heteroskedastic error. The coe¢ cients 2 and 3 indicate the short-run responsiveness of …xed investment to sales growth, whilst the coe¢ cient 4 indicates the speed of adjustment of the capital stock towards its desired level. captures the impact of the …nancial ratio introduced in the equation.
A positive coe¢ cient is expected for pro…tability, and negative ones for debt burden and indebtedness ratios. This equation is estimated separately for each one of the six countries considered with the data contained in the AMADEUS database.
The estimation method consists of the GMM-System estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and examined in detail in Blundell and Bond (1998) . These models control for …xed e¤ects with the estimator being an extension of the GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) and estimates equations not only in …rst di¤erences but also in levels. The use of GMM-System estimator is especially justi…ed in the case of autoregressive models with high persistence in the data such that the lagged levels of a variable are not highly correlated with the …rst di¤erence, something that results in …nite sample biases associated with weak instruments in the …rst-di¤erence estimator. Blundell and Bond (1998) show that in these circumstances also including the levels equations in the system estimator o¤ers signi…cant gains, countering the bias.
They also show that in autoregressive-distributed lag models, …rst-di¤erences of the variables can be used as instruments in the levels equations provided that they are mean stationary. The high levels of serial correlation displayed by several variables included in the models and the fact that they can be regarded as mean stationary favour the use of a GMM-System estimator rather than the …rst-di¤erence estimator.
The estimation method requires the absence of second order serial correlation in the …rst di¤erenced residuals for which the test of Arellano and Bond (1991) is presented (labelled M 2 ). If the underlying models residuals are indeed white noise then …rst-order serial correlation should be expected in the …rst-di¤erenced residuals for which we also present the test of Arellano and Bond (1991) , labelled M 1 . We also report the results of the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions as test for instrument validity in the GMM-System equations. Lagged levels of the explanatory variables are used as instruments.
The estimation was initially carried out using the same set of instruments for all the countries, but in some countries second order autocorrelation tests and Sargan tests rejected the validity of the instruments. To avoid this problem, alternative sets of instruments were used for the di¤erent countries, checking afterwards if there were signi…cant changes in the results
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obtained. The signi…cance of the variables of interest remains when using a common set of instruments 5 . Table 2 shows the results obtained for the baseline speci…cation (that is, before including …nancial variables). As can be seen, the results are in line with those found in similar studies (see amongst others Bond et al (2003) or Hernando and Martinez-Carrascal (2008) ): the errorcorrection term (k y) it 2 is correctly signed and statistically signi…cant and the sales growth (either contemporaneous or lagged) has a positive short-run impact on investment, which is statistically signi…cant at conventional signi…cance levels in almost all cases. 6 Also in line with these studies, lagged investment rate is found to be insigni…cant in all the countries except France. We …nd the expected …rst-order serial correlation in our …rst-di¤erenced residuals while there is no evidence of second order serial correlation, the key requirement for validity of our instrumentation strategy. The Sargan test statistics are insigni…cant at conventional (5%) levels. Table 3 presents the same regression but including the pro…tability indicator. For all countries pro…tability turns out to be signi…cant: Italy shows the highest estimated coe¢ cient (for each percentage point increase in pro…tability, investment rate increases by 0.6 percentage points), while in contrast Germany shows a relatively lower level in comparison with the rest of the countries, somewhat less than half the one estimated for Italy. The country-ranking according to the magnitude of the estimated cash ‡ow coe¢ cient is the same as that reported in Chatelain et al (2003) where cash ‡ow sensitivities of investment have been tested for Germany, France, Italy and Spain. As it has been extensively discussed in the literature on investment and …nancial constraints, a signi…cant cash ‡ow coe¢ cient might not be enough to prove the existence of …nancing constraints, since cash ‡ow e¤ects could just be a proxy for investment opportunities. However, to the extent that a similar relationship between current cash ‡ow and 5 Just in one case (see footnote 11) the signi…cance seems to depend more on the set of instruments used. See Tables A1, A2 and A3 in Appendix 2 for results using common instruments for all countries. 6 Just for Spain sales fall short of signi…cance, although the p-value associated to lagged growth rate of sales in this country is quite low -11.6%-. For the error correction term, the p-value is also somewhat above 10% in the French case. An anonymous referee suggested that this lack of signi…cance could be driven by the use of a too heterogeneous sample and suggested to repeat the estimation presented in this paper using only companies in the manufacturing sector. The results are presented in Appendix 3. This change in the sample does not have substantial impact on the results, but indeed an increase in the signi…cance of the error correction terms is observed in some cases.
Results
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September 2008 future pro…tability across countries exists, di¤erences in the estimated coe¢ cients on the cash ‡ow variables are more likely to re ‡ect di¤erences in the e¤ects of …nancing constraints. The results of a simple forecasting model for pro…tability seem to point in this direction, as there are no signi…cant di¤erences in the forecasting power of lagged or current cash ‡ow for future pro…tability across countries.
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In addition to the relationship between investment rates and pro…tability, it is also relevant to know how companies may adjust in the light of balance sheet pressures linked to their level of indebtedness. Table 4 shows the results obtained when the indebtedness ratio is included in the baseline investment equation. In line with the descriptive evidence shown above, a negative (and signi…cant) coe¢ cient is obtained in Belgium and France. Also for Italy and Spain evidence in favour of a contractive impact of indebtedness on investment rates is found, which was not so clear-cut according to the descriptive analysis. In the Germany and in the Netherlands this variable turns out to be insigni…cant. However, in the Dutch case, the rather limited signi…cance of this ratio seems to be linked to the fact that the coe¢ cients are estimated quite imprecisely, rather than to a low magnitude 8 . Hence, these results suggest that a high level of debt can lead to balance sheet adjustments in the form of companies deferring or foregoing investment projects (see Vermeulen, 2002 for an industry-level study). The comparison of coe¢ cients across countries shows that the largest sensitivity of investment to indebtedness changes is observed in the Netherlands and, to a minor extent, in Italy, while German …rms present the lowest sensitivity.
Finally, Table 5 shows the reports obtained when …nancial pressure is proxied by debt burden. Signi…cant (negative) coe¢ cients are indications that monetary policy has an impact on …rms' investment rates through the induced changes in the costs of debt servicing. Only in Germany the signi…cance of this indicator is somewhat more limited (p-value=14%). 9 The highest response to changes in debt burden is estimated for the Netherlands and Italy. 10 Belgium,
France and Spain show lower (and similar) investment rate sensitivities, which are above the 7 Results available upon request. 8 When the analysis is just based on a more homogeneous sample including only manufacturing …rms, this ratio is found to be signi…cant for a 10% signi…cance level (p-value=6.6%. See Appendix 3). 9 The signi…cance of the debt burden indicator in Germany is also more dependent on the set of instruments used than in the rest of the countries. In fact, when using common instruments for all countries, the signi…cance of this variable decreases further (see Appendix 2). 1 0 The p-value associated to the Sargan test in the Italian case is very low (1.4%), but the M 2 statistic indicates that the key condition for instrument validity holds. On the basis of Monte Carlo analysis, Blundell et al (2000) report that the Sargan test tends to over-reject in the context of this estimator. In line with this, Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) Hence, even if the marginal impact of changes in the debt burden on investment is estimated to be lower for Italy than for the Netherlands, the impact of the increase in …nancing costs would be higher for the average Italian company, as it faces a higher degree of …nan-cial pressure. Likewise, in spite of the fact that the coe¢ cient estimated for France is higher than for Germany, the average …rm in France is the one less a¤ected by the increase given its comparatively sounder …nancial position. Overall, this simple exercise illustrates that both the heterogeneity in the magnitude of the marginal impact of debt burden on investment rates and in the …nancial position are important to make a proper assessment of the impact of changes in monetary policy on investment rates.
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The results presented in Section 5 point to signi…cant di¤erences across countries in the sensitivity shown by investment rates to changes in …rms'…nancial pressure. This sensitivity seems relatively low in Germany, while it is de…nitely higher in the Netherlands and in Italy. Di¤er-ences in the size and sector compositions of the samples used, as well as di¤erences in country …nancial structures, might be important elements to explain those di¤erences in sensitivities.
A …rst factor that can be potentially contributing to explaining the di¤erences in the results across countries is the di¤erent composition of the sample in each of the countries considered. As presented in Section 2, samples for Belgium, France, Italy and Spain show a much higher percentage of SMEs, while in Germany and the Netherlands the size composition of the sample is less representative of the actual size composition in the population and more biased towards large …rms. SMEs are usually thought to be more a¤ected by the asymmetric information problems that are the basis for the existence of …nancing constraints, since they are expected to be more opaque towards external investors. In particular, they do not usually enter into publicly visible contracts and do not usually issue traded securities that are continuously priced in public markets. The evidence available in this respect in the empirical literature is, however, inconclusive, as there are con ‡icting results regarding the correlation between size and …nancing constraints 11 . As for our econometric results, this factor could explain why investment rate sensitivity to …nancial position changes is relatively low in Germany, but not why it is found to be especially large in the Netherlands. In any case, when we allow for a di¤erent marginal impact of indebtedness, debt burden and pro…tability for SMEs and large …rms, our regression results do not conclusively point to SMEs investment rates being di¤erently and, in particular, more negatively a¤ected by changes in their …nancial position than large …rms (see Table 6 ). In fact, the point estimates of the di¤erence in the sensitivity of investment to …nancial factors between SMEs and large …rms are not only non-signi…cant in general but also non-systematically positive or negative. Only for Belgium we …nd some evidence in favour of a higher contractive impact for SMEs of increases in …nancial pressure on investment rates, in line with the results presented in Butzen et al (2003) for this country. Overall, our results might be indicating that size is not a good indicator of informational asymmetries that are often mentioned as one of the main factors leading into …nancing costraints. 
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Di¤erences in the sectoral composition of the sample could also be driving the di¤erences in investment rates' sensitivities across countries. There can be di¤erences in the degree of …nancing constraints faced by …rms in the various sectors due, for example, to di¤erences in the available collateral. As seen in Table 1 , close to 30% of the companies in the German sample are in the electricity, gas and water supply sector, transport, storage and communications, while in Italy and France this percentage is hardly above 5%. The Spanish sample also shows a low rate of companies in this sector (below 7%), while for the Netherlands the observed percentage is quite higher (12%). As …rms in these sectors keep a high percentage of …xed assets in their balance sheets, they might be able to obtain more easily external …nance than …rms in other sectors such as construction and wholesale and retail trade, for which short-term assets (usually less suitable to be used as collateral) are more important. However, we do not …nd a clearcut evidence supporting systematic sectoral di¤erences in the impact of …nancial position on investment across countries (see Table 7 ).
Another reason why …nancing constraints might be more powerful in some countries than in others is that …nancial systems deal di¤erently with asymmetric information problems.
In this sense, it is commonly argued that …nancing constraints might be more severe in more market-oriented …nancial systems because borrowers and lenders operate at arms-length relationship compared to bank-based systems, where banks invest in long-term relationships with their clients, thereby reducing asymmetric information problems. The results in Bond et al. (2003) , for example, point in this direction: they …nd higher sensitivity of investment rates to changes in cash ‡ow in the United Kingdom than in more bank-based systems such as Belgium, France and Germany. Also Valderrama (2003) , for example, …nds that Austrian companies with tighter relationships with the main bank react less to cash ‡ow than …rms with less intense relationships. 12 The results found here are partly in line with the relationship channel hypothesis, as Germany shows the lowest sensitivity of investment rates to changes in …nancial variables while the Netherlands stands in the opposite extreme. The "house banks" system prevailing in Germany, in which …rms establish …nancial relationships with only one bank, implies a much closer linkage to a single bank than in many other countries, something that can help to reduce asymmetric information problems. In any case, this hypothesis has not been tested directly in the paper and our estimated results can also be consistent with alternative explanations. In fact, while the sensitivity seems to be the highest in the Netherlands, a more market-oriented 1 2 Leaving aside the advantages of close relationships with lenders for a given indebtedness level, …rms more dependent on bank …nancing will be more a¤ected by changes in the supply of loans than …rms that have easy access to other sources of external …nancing. In line with this, Haan and Sterken (2006) conclude that small private …rms use less debt after a monetary tightening, but somewhat less in bank-based economies.
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September 2008 system 13 , in the case of Belgium and France, where equity …nancing plays an important role, investment sensitivity is not found to be high in comparison with the rest of the countries. In the case of Belgium, this could be partly explained by the existence of pyramidal ownership structures, with holding companies playing a signi…cant role in the …nancing and in the management of their a¢ liated …rms hence lowering the external …nance premium.
The relationship channel cannot explain why Italy shows a comparatively high investment sensitivity to changes in …nancial position. It could be partly related, though, to the fact that a high percentage of loans is backed by collateral, which might result in a more accentuated impact of the balance sheet channel (since the negative impact on asset prices -and hence on collateral values-of monetary policy contractions might have a more signi…cant impact on credit availability). 14 An additional factor that can contribute to the high sensitivity estimated for
Italy is the comparatively weaker …nancial position observed for …rms in this country, if a nonlinear impact of …nancial position on investment exists. Descriptive evidence shown in Section 3 might point in this direction, especially for the debt burden indicator.
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Concluding remarks
We have analysed the sensitivity of investment to changes in …nancial pressure faced by …rms with a large sample of …rms in six euro area countries (Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain), which broadly represent 90% of GDP in the euro area. Financial pressure has been proxied by …rm indebtedness, debt burden and pro…tability. One positive characteristic of the database used for the analysis is that the percentage of smaller …rms in these samples, that are those expected to be more a¤ected by asymmetric information problems and, as a result, by …nancial constraints, is much higher than in previous studies. sensitivities across countries. For instance, …rms in Germany are found to be the ones with the lowest marginal impact of …nancial pressure on investment rates, while the highest impact has been found for Dutch and Italian …rms.
We have also investigated if the di¤erences in sensitivity found across countries can be due to di¤erences in the sample composition and more speci…cally to sectoral or size composition di¤erences. The results do not point in this direction, since no signi…cant di¤erences have been found in investment rate responsiveness to changes in …nancial pressure for di¤erent size groups.
Neither systematic sectoral di¤erences in this sensitivity have been found.
The analysis has also given an insight on how, by altering the …nancial pressure experienced by …rms in servicing their debt, monetary policy may operate through the corporate sector. It has been illustrated how the heterogeneity both in the magnitude of the marginal impact of debt burden on investment rates and in the level of indebtedness is important to evaluate potential asymmetries on the impact of changes in monetary policy on investment rates.
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Notes: All equations include time and sectoral dummies. Estimated coefficients and asymptotic robust standard errors reported. Estimation by GMM-SYSTEM estimator using the robust one-step method (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Arellano and Bond, 1998) . Sargan is a Sargan Test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value reported). M j is a test of jth-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals (p-values reported). Instruments: in first-differences equation, following lagged values of the regressors: Belgium: I/K (t-5, t-6), ∆y (t-2 to t-4), (k-y) (t-4 to t-6), CF/A (t-4, t-5); Germany: I/K (t-4), ∆y (t-2 to t-4) (k-y) (t-3 to t-5) CF/A (t-4 to t-6); France: I/K (t-6 to t-7), ∆y (t-6), (k-y) (t-5 to t-6), CF/A (t-4, t-5); Italy: I/K (t-7), ∆y (t-6, t-7), (k-y) (t-5 to t-6); Netherlands: I/K (t-4, t-5), ∆y (t-2 to t-4), (k-y) (t-3 to t-4) CF/A (t-4, t-5); Spain I/K (t-7), ∆y (t-6), (k-y) (t-6 to t-7), CF/A (t-5). In levels equations, first differences of the regressors dated as follows: Belgium:∆y (t-3) and CF/A (t-5); Germany ∆y (t-4), CF/A (t-4); France ∆y (t-5); Italy ∆y (t-5), CF/A (t-3); Netherlands: ∆y (t-4), CF/A (t-3); Spain: ∆y (t-5), CF/A (t-3). *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%,5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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Notes: All equations include time and sectoral dummies. Estimated coefficients and asymptotic robust standard errors reported. Estimation by GMM-SYSTEM estimator using the robust one-step method (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Arellano and Bond, 1998) . Sargan is a Sargan Test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value reported). M j is a test of jth-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals (p-values reported). Instruments: in first-differences equation, following lagged values of the regressors: Belgium: I/K (t-5, t-6), ∆y (t-2 to t-4), (k-y) (t-4 to t-6), (D-L)/A (t-3 to t-5); Germany: I/K (t-4), ∆y (t-2 to t-4), (k-y) (t-3 to t-5), (D-L)/A (t-3 to t-5); France: I/K (t-6, t-7), ∆y (t-6), (k-y) (t-5, t-6), (D-L)/A (t-4, t-5); Italy: I/K (t-7), ∆y (t-6, t-7), (k-y) (t-5, t-6) (D-L)/A (t-5); Netherlands: I/K (t-4, t-5), ∆y (t-2 to t-4), (k-y) (t-3, t-4), (D-L)/A (t-3 to t-5); Spain I/K (t-7), ∆y (t-6), (k-y) (t-6, t-7). In levels equations, first differences of the regressors dated as follows Notes: All equations include time and sectoral dummies. Estimated coefficients and asymptotic robust standard errors reported. Estimation by GMM-SYSTEM estimator using the robust one-step method (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Arellano and Bond, 1998) . Sargan is a Sargan Test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value reported). M j is a test of jth-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals (p-values reported). Instruments: in first-differences equation, following lagged values of the regressors: Belgium: (I/K) (t-5, t-6), ∆y (t-2 to t-4) (k-y) (t-4 to t-6), db (t-3 to t-5); Germany: (I/K) (t-4), ∆y (t-2 to t-4) (k-y) (-3 to t-5), db (t-5); France: (I/K) (t-6 to t-7), ∆y (t-6) (k-y) (t-5 to t-6); Italy: (I/K) (t-7), ∆y (t-6, t-7) (ky) (t-5 to t-6), br (t-6); Netherlands: (I/K) (t-4, t-5), ∆y (t-2 to t-4) (k-y) (t-3 to t-4) db (t-3 to t-5); Spain (I/K) (t-7), ∆y (t-6) (k-y) (t-6 to t-7), db (t-6 to t-7). In levels equations, first differences of the regressors dated as follows: Belgium:∆y (t-3), (D-L)/A (t-4); Germany ∆y (t-4) and db (t-2); France ∆y (t-5), db (t-2); Italy ∆y and db (t-5); Netherlands: ∆y and db (t-4); Spain: ∆y and db (t-2).*,**,*** indicate significance at 10%,5% and 1% significance level, respectively. Belgium Note : Diff. SMEs captures, for each financial ratio, the differential impact of that ratio on investment rates for SMEs. *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%,5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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France Belgium
Note : Diff. sector j captures, for each financial ratio, the differential impact of that ratio on investment rates for sector j. Manufacturing sector is the reference sector (sector 1). Sector 2 includes firms in the electricity gas, water supply, transport, storage and communication sectors. Sector 3, 4 and 5 includes companies in the construction, services and trade sectors, respectively.*,**,*** indicate significance at 10%,5% and 1% significance level, respectively. The AMADEUS database does not contain data on gross investment directly, but it can be calculated using the data on capital stock and depreciation as follows:
Germany
The capital stock is constructed using the perpetual inventory method. Since the values available for the capital stock are at book value (that is, at historical prices), we multiply the value at historical prices for the first year of observation available for each firm by a factor adjusting for historical inflation to get an estimation of the initial value ( it K 1 ) ) of the capital stock at replacement value (that is, at time t 1 prices).
The perpetual inventory formula is then used to obtain the estimated value of the stock of capital at replacement cost: where δ is the depreciation rate of the stock of capital (based on aggregate data at country level).
Debt minus cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets
Debt burden (db t )
Interest payments divided by gross revenue plus financial revenue
Cash flow (CF t /A t-1 )
Post-tax profit plus depreciation of fixed assets divided by total assets For interest debt burden, when companies have a negative or zero value for the denominator and a positive value for the numerator, the ratio is set equal to the value of the 99 th percentile that year; when the numerator is zero, the ratio is set equal to zero, for any value of the denominator.
For all the variables used in the analysis, when the value is over the 99 th percentile, this value is changed for that corresponding to this percentile.
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Italy Spain
Note : All equations include time and sectoral dummies. Estimated coefficients and asymptotic robust standard reported. Estimation by GMM-SYSTEM estimator using the robust one-step method (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Arellano and Bond, 1998) . Sargan is a Sargan Test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value reported). Mj is a test of jth-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals (p-values reported). Instruments: in first-differences equation, following lagged values of the regressors: I/K (t-4, t-5), ∆y (t-2 to t-4), (k-y) (t-3 to t-4) CF/A (t-4, t-5). In levels equations, first differences of the regressors dated as follows: ∆y (t-4), CF/A (t-3).*,**,*** indicate significance at 10%,5% and 1% significance level, respectively.
Netherlands
Belgium
Germany France 
Spain
Notes: All equations include time and sectoral dummies. Estimated coefficients and asymptotic robust standard . Estimation by GMM-SYSTEM estimator using the robust one-step method (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Arellano and Bond, 1998) . Sargan is a Sargan Test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value reported). Mj is a test of jth-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals (p-values reported). Instruments: in first-differences equation, following lagged values of the regressors: I/K (t-4, t-5), ∆y (t-2 to t-4), (k-y) (t-3, t-4), (D-L)/A (t-3 to t-5). In levels equations, first differences of the regressors dated as follows: ∆y and (D-L)/A (t-4). *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%,5% and 1% significance level, respectively. Notes: All equations include time and sectoral dummies. Estimated coefficients and asymptotic robust standard errors reported. Estimation by GMM-SYSTEM estimator using the robust one-step method (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Arellano and Bond, 1998) . Sargan is a Sargan Test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value reported). Mj is a test of jth-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals (p-values reported). Instruments: in first-differences equation, following lagged values of the regressors: (I/K) (t-4, t-5), ∆y (t-2 to t-4) (k-y) (t-3 to t-4) db (t-3 to t-5). In levels equations, first differences of the regressors dated as follows: ∆y and db (t-4).*,**,*** indicate significance at 10%,5% and 1% significance level, respectively. Notes: All equations include time dummies. Estimated coefficients and asymptotic robust standard errors reported. Estimation by GMM-SYSTEM estimator using the robust one-step method (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Arellano and Bond, 1998) . Sargan is a Sargan Test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value reported). Mj is a test of jth-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals (p-values reported). Instruments: in first-differences equation, following lagged values of the regressors: Belgium: I/K (t-4, t-5), ∆y (t-2 to t-4), (k-y) (t-4 to t-5), (CF/A) (t-4, t-5); Germany: I/K (t-4), ∆y (t-2 to t-4), (k-y) (t-3 to t-5), (CF/A)/A (t-4 to t-6); France: I/K (t-5, t-7), ∆y (t-4,t-6), (k-y) (t-6, t-7), (CF/A)/A (t-4); Italy: I/K (t-7), ∆y (t-6, t-7), (k-y) (t-5, t-6); Netherlands: I/K (t-4, t-5), ∆y (t-2 to t-4), (k-y) (t-3, t-4), (CF/A) (t-4, t-5); Spain I/K (t-5, t-6), ∆y (t-6), (k-y) (t-5, t-6), (CF/A) (t-4 to t-6). In levels equations, first differences of the regressors dated as follows: Belgium: ∆y (t-3), (k-y) (t-3), (CF/A) (t-3); Germany ∆y (t-4), (CF/A) (t-2); France I/K (t-5), ∆y (t-4), (CF/A) (t-3); Italy: (I/K) and ∆y (t-6), (k-y) and (CF/A) (t-3); Netherlands: ∆y and (CF/A) (t-3); Spain: ∆y (t-5), Notes: All equations include time dummies. Estimated coefficients and asymptotic robust standard errors reported. Estimation by GMM-SYSTEM estimator using the robust one-step method (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Arellano and Bond, 1998) . Sargan is a Sargan Test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value reported). M j is a test of jth-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals (pvalues reported). Instruments: in first-differences equation, following lagged values of the regressors: Belgium: I/K (t-4, t-5), ∆y (t-2 to t-4), (k-y) (t-4, t-5), (D-L)/A (t-3 to t-5); Germany: I/K (t-4), ∆y (t-2 to t-4), (k-y) (t-3 to t-5), (D-L)/A (t-3, t-4); France: I/K (t-5, t-7), ∆y (t-4 to t-6), (k-y) (t-6, t-7), (D-L)/A (t-5, t-6); Italy: I/K (t-7), ∆y (t-6, t-7), (k-y) (t-5, t-6) (D-L)/A (t-5); Netherlands: I/K (t-4, t-5), ∆y (t-2 to t-4), (k-y) (t-3, t-4), (D-L)/A (t-3 to t-5); Spain I/K (t-5, t-6), ∆y (t-6), (k-y) (t-5, t-6). In levels equations, first differences of the regressors dated as follows: Belgium: ∆y (t-3), (k-y) (t- 
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France Germany
Notes : All equations include time dummies. Estimated coefficients and asymptotic robust standard errors reported. Estimation by GMM-SYSTEM estimator using the robust one-step method (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Arellano and Bond, 1998) . Sargan is a Sargan Test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value reported). Mj is a test of jth-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals (p-values reported). Instruments: in first-differences equation, following lagged values of the regressors:Belgium: I/K (t-4, t-5), ∆y (t-2 to t-4), (k-y) (t-4 to t-5), db (t-3, t-4); Germany: I/K (t-4), ∆y (t-2 to t-4), (k-y) (t-3 to t-5), db/A (t-3 to t-4); France: I/K (t-5, t-7), ∆y (t-4,t-6), (k-y) (t-6, t-7), db/A (t-2, t-3); Italy: I/K (t-7), ∆y (t-6, t-7), (k-y) (t-5, t-6), db (t-6); Netherlands: I/K (t-4, t-5), ∆y (t-2 to t-4), (k-y) (t-3, t-4), db (t-4, t-5); Spain I/K (t-5, t-6), ∆y (t-6), (k-y) (t-5, t-6), db (t-4 to t-6). In levels equations, first differences of the regressors dated as follows: Belgium: ∆y (t-3), (k-y) (t-3), db (t-1); Germany ∆y (t-4), db (t-2); France I/K (t-5), ∆y (t-4), db (t-4); Italy: (I/K) and ∆y (t-6), (k-y) and db (t-6); Netherlands: ∆y and db (t-3); Spain: ∆y (t-5), db (t-2). *,**,*** indicate signifi- 
